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Chapter 1.

Introduction
More and m ore expert systems (ESs) are being developed for business and
accounting applications. ES applications range from those for accounting and
auditing, to those for tax and finance, to those for operations m anagem ent and
production. A survey o f some of the auditing applications o f expert systems is
provided in O ’Leary and Watkins (1989).
For example, TRW now uses an expert system to verify that individuals
attem pting to access a credit reporting system are valid users. Recent newspaper
articles have focused on the potential litigation associated with the unauthorized
use of credit reporting systems; accordingly, the protection of such systems from
intruders is critical.
Security Pacific has developed an expert system to assist in identifying the
fraudulent use of debit cards with autom ated teller m achines (ATMs). If it deter
mines that fraud is likely, the expert system can block the use o f the ATM system.
The first two systems are intrusion-detection systems, which are designed
to determ ine if a user is an intruder. A nother type of expert system is used by
Northwest Airlines to verify the pricing of the tickets that it issues. Using scan
ning, the system verifies between 50,000 and 60,000 tickets each night.
As these examples suggest, expert systems can serve as sophisticated tools
for protecting and effectively m anaging valuable corporate assets. But expert
systems are n o t ju st tools; they are also corporate assets in themselves and, as
such, are vulnerable to tam pering and increasingly require the consideration of
the auditor. Accordingly, the purpose o f this rep o rt is to provide some guidance
to those concerned with the internal audit and security o f ES applications,
both in accounting and non-accounting applications.

What Are
Expert Systems?

Typically, expert systems are com puter program s that incorporate certain
am ounts of expertise or knowledge derived from hum an sources. These pro
grams are used by a decision m aker to assist in the decision-making process.
In some cases, the systems function independently o f a hum an user; however,
such systems are rare.
Many systems are developed using expert system software referred to as
an expert system shell. This software facilitates the developm ent of representations
of the knowledge gathered from experts. For exam ple, an ES shell could help
a developer design rules according to which knowledge would be stored (for
example, “If condition N, then consequence Q”). These rules sometimes include
a weight representing the “strength of association” or probability of a statem ent.
Shells also contain an inference engine that sorts through the knowledge in
order to find the answers to user inquiries.
ESs sometimes also interface with data bases. W hen this is the case, the sys
tems can derive data from data bases to assist in the developm ent o f answers to
user inquiries. Alternatively, users may be responsible for providing the data.

The Scope of
This Report

Accounting researchers and system developers have been working with artificial
intelligence and expert systems for almost ten years. D uring that time, account
ing and auditing expert systems have gone from the lab to the field. Now, expert
systems are available to auditors and tax accountants alike. In addition, auditors
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are no t only currently using expert systems in their audits, but are also facing
expert systems that their com pany may be using in its operations. As a result,
auditing such systems is an increasingly im portant consideration.
Unfortunately, both research on and experience with the auditing of
expert systems are lim ited, which could have severe consequences. As noted by
M oeller (1988, p. 8), “O ne would hope that we will n o t have to wait for an
‘Equity F unding’ type of event covering an expert system in order to have the
im petus for sufficient audit guidance materials.” (Although M oeller’s article
focuses on external audit considerations, his com m ents are of value to the inter
nal auditor as well.) Thus, one purpose of this rep o rt is to investigate some of the
prim ary concerns in the auditing o f expert systems.
A nother issue critical to the initial and ongoing success of expert systems is
security. If an ES is n o t secure, it will be vulnerable to a loss of assets (possibly a
loss in the particular application dom ain, for exam ple, accounting, or a loss of
knowledge to com petitors). Further, it will also be vulnerable to a loss of system
credibility: The system could be changed, for example, and m ight n o t function
appropriately. T here are other reasons for ensuring the security o f an expert
system as well, some o f which are discussed later in this report. Thus, the
second purpose of this rep o rt is to investigate some o f the issues relating to
the security of expert systems.

The Structure of
This Report

6

This rep o rt proceeds as follows. C hapter 1 has provided an introduction.
C hapter 2 analyzes the unique aspects of expert systems and some o f the impli
cations for the auditing and security of expert systems.
C hapter 3 exam ines the auditing of expert systems. A summ ary o f some
of the previous research on auditing expert systems appears, followed by an
extensive analysis of the types o f systems that may need to be audited after
the risk assessment of each system has been taken into consideration. The
chapter concludes with a brief summ ary of some verification and validation
approaches developed by com puter scientists that can be useful in the audit
of expert systems.
C hapter 4 analyzes the security o f expert systems. The prim ary focus in
this chapter is on addressing the unique aspects o f expert systems described
in chapter 2 in the developm ent of a set of control considerations for
expert systems.
C hapter 5 investigates the implications of additional issues on both the
audit and security o f expert systems. C hapter 6 provides a brief sum m ary of
this report.

Chapter

2.

Unique Aspects of Expert Systems
Expert systems are com puter program s and should be treated as such. However, a
num ber o f their characteristics differentiate expert systems from other com puter
program s, creating new audit and security risks.
These unique characteristics include the developm ent environm ent (the
policies, procedures, and approaches used to develop an expert system), the
delivery environm ent, the m aintenance environm ent, the lim itations of the soft
ware, the technique o f downward delegation, the source of data used by an
expert system, the sim ultaneous incorporation of symbolic and num eric infor
m ation within an expert system, the explanation o f the knowledge, the user
interface of an expert system, the nature o f the problem structured in an expert
system, and the notion that an expert system em ulates hum an behavior.
Much o f the uniqueness deriving from these characteristics relates to the
knowledge in an expert system. Knowledge in an expert system is gathered from
a variety of sources, including hum an experts, questionnaires, and books. In any
case, that knowledge is likely to be a valuable asset o f the firm for which the
expert system has been built. T herefore, it is necessary to establish appropriate
controls to ensure that the knowledge is secure.
Some of these controls include those over the entry o f knowledge into the
system, the ability to access that knowledge for purposes o f either changing it or
controlling its “leakage,” the solicitation o f inform ation that leads the system to
use the wrong knowledge, and the use o f knowledge to camouflage oth er knowl
edge (for example, Trojan horse program s that have nam es and functions that
conceal their actual purpose).
In addition, it is necessary to audit an expert system’s knowledge to ensure
that it is correct and com plete. Auditors have n o t been in a position to audit the
quality o f knowledge. As a result, new approaches need to be considered. These
unique differences point to new audit concerns.
Since the auditing and security o f traditional systems have been the
subjects of many books and papers, this rep o rt will n o t address these topics. How
ever, this rep o rt is concerned with those factors that im pact all com puter systems
and have relatively unique implications for the security and auditing of an expert
system. Four aspects o f expert systems are identified in this regard:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

integration of expert systems with o th er systems.
unique aspects o f the audit and security teams.
system developers (an outside vendor, an internal user, and so fo rth ).
users’ attitudes towards an expert system.

These aspects are discussed further in C hapter 5.

Development
Environment

In many cases, expert systems are developed by dom ain experts or users, not
by a software engineer in the systems developm ent departm ent. For example,
D uPont’s well-known approach is to support the developm ent of a large num ber
of expert systems by individual users. Since the systems developm ent departm ent
is not included in the process, it is not likely that an expert system will be devel
oped with the same formality and structure of m ore traditional com puter systems,
nor is it likely that the developm ent process or a system itself will be docum ented.
In addition, there is no generally accepted m odel o f a life cycle or develop
m ent m ethodology for expert systems. As a result, even if the developm ent
process was docum ented, there would be no one m odel with which the process
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could be com pared in order to determ ine its quality. Thus, it is often impossible
for the auditor to satisfy him self or herself regarding the quality of a system based
on the developm ent process. Accordingly, there is little basis on which to audit
the input or developm ent process. Due to the limitations of the developm ent
process, m ore emphasis is placed on the testing of the system to ensure its qual
ity. Tests of system quality generally are referred to as validation and verification
tests, and are discussed later in this report.
ESs are normally developed using a “m iddle o u t” approach, also referred
to as a prototyping approach. Successive versions of a system are developed itera
tively as the problem at hand becom es better understood. Indeed, the prototype
assists in developing a better understanding so that another version of the system
can be developed. This process allows the developer to gradually determ ine the
knowledge that is necessary for the system to function properly. This approach
contrasts with m ore traditional software engineering approaches such as the
“top down” or “bottom u p ” approaches.
Although prototyping has been found to be an excellent m ethod of elicit
ing knowledge and gradually structuring a decision problem , it does introduce
some security concerns. Researchers have found that prototyping makes m anag
ing and controlling the system developm ent process m ore difficult. If m anaging
the process is m ore difficult, it may also be m ore difficult to m aintain security
and easier for som eone to sabotage the system.

Delivery
Environment

W hen the user is the developer, the personal com puter (PC) typically serves
as the developm ent and delivery environm ent. Further, since PCs can be taken
almost everywhere and are generally easy to use, many ESs that interface directly
with users are developed for a PC environm ent.
Given the portability and relative ease o f use of PC-based systems, it is
difficult to control the extent o f a system’s use. The ease with which PC software
can be replicated and a PC can be accessed by o th er users is a prim ary concern.
Systems can be developed and play an integral p art in decision m aking without
the internal auditors ever becom ing aware of their existence. Even when the
internal auditor is familiar with the developm ent of a system, there is no guaran
tee that the extent to which it may be duplicated or used by others can be
controlled. Moreover, ESs created for PC environm ents are generally developed
for PC operating systems, which have few security devices. In addition, access
controls in PCs and workstations generally are severely lacking.

Maintenance
Environment

The m aintenance of the knowledge base of an expert system raises a num ber of
audit-related questions, including the following:
■ W ho can update the knowledge in the system?
■ How is the updating process accomplished?
■ Does the updating process jeopardize the quality o f the knowledge?
T he security of a system can be jeopardized if naive users are responsible
for updating it. A lthough it is often suggested that knowledge can be freely
entered and rem oved w ithout disturbing the system, knowledge bases are fragile.
The technical nature o f the relationship between pieces o f knowledge can be
delicate and, without appropriate knowledge m aintenance, is easily disrupted
by naive users.
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Software Limitations

A portion of knowledge in expert systems (typically less than 10 percent) escapes
standard representation schemes and requires special fixes. These special fixes can
take any of a num ber of designs. For example, in order to accommodate non-rulebased knowledge representation in a rule-based expert system shell, an external
program or m odule may be used. In addition, a linear program m ing m odule or
statistical module may be used to supplem ent or interface with the system.
Special fixes pose an audit risk, since they may require additional audit
tests that are not required for the rest of the system being audited. Further, the
possible existence o f special fixes is an audit concern, since auditors will not
perform additional tests if they have no knowledge of them .
Special fixes also pose a security risk because they offer the opportunity to
hide knowledge that can result in unusual or dysfunctional behavior. Special fixes
that involve additional m odules, for example, offer the potential for intruders to
hide Trojan horse program s.

Downward Delegation

By capturing expert knowledge in a com puter system, expert systems allow
expertise to be leveraged. Thus, ESs can be used to “delegate” decision making
downward. However, instances of downward delegation can lead to situations in
which the ES needs access to data for which the user may n o t have appropriate
clearance. T hat is, the ES may have a higher priority than the user. As a result,
either authorized or unauthorized access to the ES can yield unauthorized access
to the data base and result in security problem s.

— Data-Base Access

Sources of Data

ESs solicit inform ation directly from the user, a data base, or both. Most tradi
tional com puter program s function independently o f the user, soliciting
substantial am ounts of inform ation from data bases. Data are massaged and
num erous steps are taken to ensure that the inform ation is correct, depending
on w hether or n o t it is in a PC environm ent.
However, w hen data are solicited directly from the user, there is a sub
stantial potential for error. H um ans make errors of omission, m isinterpretation,
inconsistency, and o th er types o f errors. If there is an erro r in the data inp u t to
the system, the ES may use the wrong knowledge, and it may develop inappropri
ate recom m endations.

Symbolic and
Numeric Information

In general, expert systems are designed to process both symbolic and num eric
inform ation. Knowledge may be represented, for exam ple, in a rule-based form at
(“if condition a, then consequence b”), and the rules may include strengths-ofevidence or probability assessments.
Traditional com puter program s typically process num eric data contained
in data bases. In the case o f num eric data bases, software is available that allows
the auditor to investigate relationships in the data. However, in the case of expert
systems, there are no similar tools, other than the expert system shell, to assist in
the exam ination of the knowledge. In addition, num eric data may generally be
easier to audit than nonnum eric data because they are no t necessarily affected by
the nuances of language and the nature of symbolic m eanings. Thus, it can be
m ore difficult for the auditor to get to the inform ation in an expert system that
needs to be audited. Since other types o f com puter program s do n o t contain
knowledge used as data by an expert system program , there has been no previous
investigation of ways to secure that knowledge, the costs o f not securing it, and a
variety of other concerns.
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O ne im portant characteristic o f many expert systems that differentiates them
Explanation of
Knowledge to the User from other com puter systems is their ability to explain their solutions and recom 
m endations. Such explanations range from a trace o f the sequence of rules that
were used to come to the conclusions to specially developed explanation systems.
These explanations reveal the insights of the experts from whom the knowledge
was gathered.
A lthough insights into how a program makes a decision may be im portant
to a decision maker, such insights may be used against the system. In the case o f a
system designed to assist in stock purchases, buy and sell rules could be discov
ered and used against the system. In the case o f an audit system, insight into what
transactions the system chooses to audit can be used against the system. Thus, the
security of this area is an o th er critical point in an ES.

User Interfaces

Typically, ESs have user-friendly interfaces. These interfaces make ESs easy to use
with both natural-language and menu-driver interfaces. This feature can facilitate
the au d ito r’s ability to gather from the system inform ation about its behavior.
Unfortunately, that ease o f use is n o t lim ited to authorized users, b u t also extends
to unauthorized users. As a result, unauthorized users with only lim ited knowl
edge may gain access to the system. This can be a m ajor security problem .

Well-Structured Vs.
Not- Yet-Structured
Problems

Most traditional com puter program s are designed to solve well-structured
problem s that previously have often been structured as com puter program s
or as m anual processes. For exam ple, accounting program s, such as those for
the accounts payable and accounts receivable functions, are well-established
com puter and m anual applications.
O n the oth er hand, m ost expert systems are designed for decision prob
lems that are no t yet structured o r difficult to structure. Previous approaches to
a given problem may include checklists or some oth er form of docum entation
or they may have no written structure. The lack of previous m odels can make the
audit process a com plicated one, since there may be no basis on which to assess
system quality.

Users'Assumptions
About Expert Systems'
Emulation of
Human Behavior

Since expert systems em ulate hum an problem-solving behavior, the reaction of
users to the em bodim ent o f the expertise in a com puter program may be a
critical variable. For example, in the case of one expert system users began to
assume that it would do all o f the things that the hum ans it replaced would do.
Unfortunately, the system was only designed to perform certain functions, and
the rem aining hum ans were expected to perform oth er functions for which
the system had no t been designed. As a result, some functions were n o t done.
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3.

Auditing Expert Systems
The audit of expert systems has received only lim ited attention to date. This
chapter summarizes some of that research. In addition, it provides a detailed
analysis of the types of systems that may need to be audited. Finally, a brief
discussion of the verification and validation o f expert systems is provided.
The verification and validation of expert systems represent an active
research area in com puter science and artificial intelligence. Its focus is on
providing m ethodologies to assist in determ ining the correctness, completeness,
and decision quality of expert systems. As such, it provides a m ajor audit tool.
C hapter 4 summarizes another audit activity: analyzing the security of expert
systems. Because the discussion o f security is so extensive, it has been placed in
its own chapter.

Previous Research on
Auditing Expert Systems

T here have been few direct references to auditing expert systems. However, at
least four papers and one discussion from a book on electronic data processing
(EDP) auditing address issues on auditing expert systems.
M oeller (1988) relates the audit of expert systems with existing audit
literature, and discusses the relationship o f Statem ent on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 3, The Effects of EDP on the Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal
Control (superseded by SAS No. 48 in July of 1984); SAS No. 48, The Effects
of Computer Processing on the Examination of Financial Statements; and SAS No. 55,
Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit to
the internal control structure of expert systems. As p a rt o f his discussion, M oeller
(1988, p. 7) notes that “while there is a growing body of other literature covering
the auditor’s use o f expert systems, there is very little published m aterial on
audit techniques for reviewing expert systems.” M oeller’s paper summarizes many
techniques and points to a body of work on those techniques that has developed
recently: the literature on verification and validation. M oeller’s perspective is
that audits of expert systems should be aim ed primarily at those systems in “finan
cially significant applications.” M oeller took this approach in recognition of
the external auditor’s role o f attesting that financial statem ents are fairly stated.
M oeller’s rep o rt suggests that in order to m eet the unique requirem ents
of expert systems, the audit of such systems could be accom plished using “con
ventional application control procedures.” In particular, he provides a control
analysis using input controls, processing controls, and ou tp u t controls.
Kick (1989) discusses some of the risk exposures associated with expert
systems resulting from a loss of strategic or competitive position, an inability to
sustain growth, and a loss of strategic knowledge. The prim ary emphasis in his
rep o rt is on ensuring that the auditor exam ine expert system applications to
determ ine w hether they are properly applied; are deployed to gain strategic
advantage; are cost-effective; are well designed and operationally efficient; m ini
mize exposure to fraud, poor decision making, and o th er consequences; are
used by individuals who are properly trained; are easy to m aintain; and are
continually updated. These issues have been referred to as effectiveness issues in
the expert system literature.
In order to accom m odate these concerns, Kick suggests audit procedures
that consist o f the following steps:
■ Examine selection priorities.
■ Review developm ent standards.
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■
■
■
■

Define roles and identify risks.
Review the knowledge engineering and validation process.
Evaluate efficiency and effectiveness.
Evaluate the m aintenance history.

Jam ieson (1990) presents an analysis of the audit of expert systems in
which he identifies a num ber o f objectives:
■
■
■
■
■

Identify the personnel relevant to an audit investigation.
Identify the developer of the system.
Present an expert system developm ent life cycle.
Review the evaluation o f expert systems.
U nderstand the security, control, and auditability
requirem ents appropriate for an expert system environm ent.
■ Review those mechanisms.
■ U nderstand where auditors should be involved in the
developm ent process.
■ Review docum entation and legal concerns associated with
expert system developm ent.

W atne and Turney (1990) briefly analyze expert systems as a target of an
audit. They suggest that systems that directly im pact the balances in the financial
statem ents or that provide inform ation to the auditor individually be the poten
tial targets of audits. They also analyze some of the controls in expert systems
using a structure based on general and application controls. W atne and Turney
also note that the com puter science area of validation, discussed below, is the
source of tests for the reliability and quality of the expert systems.
McKee (1991) investigates a theory of the dem and for audits o f expert
systems. His investigation provides a market-based analysis of the factors leading
up to voluntary audits. These factors include:
■
■
■
■

T he
The
T he
The

perception o f conflict o f interest.
im portance of the consequences o f the use of the system.
complexity o f the system.
rem oteness of those who m ight perform audits.

McKee’s rep o rt also suggests that AICPA Statements on Standards for
Attestation Engagem ents (SSAE), Attestation Standards m ight play a critical
role in the audit of expert systems, and although it applies to in d ep en d en t CPAs,
it may also provide useful guidance to internal auditors. Attestation Standards
indicates that an audit should be done by som eone who has adequate technical
knowledge and proficiency, in this case in expert systems verification and valida
tion, and in the specific dom ain. In addition, Attestation Standards indicates that
the assertion is capable of being evaluated against reasonable criteria that either
have been established by a recognized body or are stated in the presentation of
the assertion in a sufficiently clear and com prehensive m anner for a knowledge
able reader to be able to understand them .

What Types of Systems
Need to Be Audited?

2
1

A critical issue in the internal audit o f expert systems is the type of systems that
may need to be audited. As is the case with traditional financial statem ent audits,
those systems that im pact the financial statem ents in a m aterial m anner require
an audit. However, since expert systems also em ulate hum an decision making,
they can have a far-reaching im pact on the internal auditor and on the firm that
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uses them . This rep o rt identifies five basic types of systems that may need to be
audited. (O f course, there may be oth er systems with which the internal auditor
m ight also be concerned after having evaluated risk assessment.) T he five basic
systems are:
1. Systems that im pact the financial statem ents
2. Systems that may im pact the going-concern status of the firm
3. Systems that provide the auditor with inform ation that is relied
on during an audit
4. Systems for which efficiency and effectiveness are o f concern to
the auditor
5. Systems that im pact the security o f o th er systems

Systems That
Impact the
Financial Statements

In some cases, the auditor will find that an expert system impacts the financial
statem ents directly. This im pact can be observed in at least two ways. First, system
activity may directly im pact a particular account, such as loans. (For example, an
expert system may be designed to assist in the loan-granting process.) Second,
the system may perform the tasks of a hum an accountant, such as allocating costs
and revenues to different accounts.
In the first case, a system designed to assist in the choice of those to
whom banks lend can directly im pact the quality of the loans. T here are many
other situations in which a system can im pact the financial statements. For
example, authorizing credit card transactions or insurance reim bursem ents
(two well-established applications) can also im pact the financial statements.
O ne aspect of these applications is the expert system’s ability to provide
an authorization for a set o f transactions. This is typical of those transactions in
which an activity has been delegated downward. W hen this is the case, expertise
is captured and used by lower level personnel. It is critical that the expert system
be audited when downward delegation exists, because the lower level personnel
would have n eith er the knowledge to recognize unusual activities program m ed
into the system n o r the authority to act on that knowledge to alter the system.
In the second case, the expert system may provide or m anipulate account
ing num bers in the same way that a hum an would. W hen this is the case, the
program could include knowledge that leads it to make some inappropriate
allocations. For example, revenues could be allocated to different periods in
order to ensure a smoothness of incom e, o r expenses could be allocated to
the wrong accounts.
In either of these cases, the materiality of the activity would be a concern.
If the levels were im m aterial and the potential for fraud minimal, further audit
ing would n o t necessarily be cost-beneficial.

Systems That Can
Impact the
Going-Concern Status
of the Firm

Many expert systems that are developed will n o t directly im pact the financial
statements, b u t they should be audited nevertheless. These systems include
those whose activity is critical to the particular firm to the extent that their failure
could force a change in its going-concern status. Such a change in
status is a definite concern for the auditor.
For example, in the case of Van de Kamps (Los Angeles Times,
Septem ber 12, 1990), a new com puter system so disrupted deliveries that the
firm was reportedly forced into bankruptcy. Although Van de Kamps was a
privately held firm and the system that was im plem ented was n o t necessarily
an expert system, the case does dem onstrate the far-reaching im pact that
a com puter system can have on going-concern status.
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It is im portant to note that SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s Consideration of an
Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, does not contain any requirem ent
that such systems be audited for financial statem ent audits. However, for internal
audit purposes, as noted in the example, the audit of such systems may be critical
to the continued existence o f the company.

Systems That Impact
the Audit

If expert systems are used in the audit process, they should be audited them 
selves. Otherwise, errors and biases may be introduced into the audit process
through the use of the audit software.

System Efficiency
and Effectiveness

O nce an expert system has been developed and found to provide correct deci
sions, attention may be focused on alternative concerns, such as its efficiency
and effectiveness. System efficiency relates to m easures such as how well a system
runs in its specific hardw are and software environm ent. For exam ple, when
expert systems were first developed, many were so slow that the users did not
want to operate them . The software with which these systems were built was very
cum bersom e. Accordingly, some systems were thought to be relatively inefficient.
System effectiveness concerns a system’s ability n o t ju st to provide correct
answers, b u t also to identify better answers. Effectiveness addresses the questions
“Can the system be im proved?” and “Does the system help users make better
decisions?”

Systems That
Impact the Security
of Other Systems

Increasingly, expert systems are being used to provide security to other systems.
These systems are used to prevent and detect intrusions into the systems that
they protect. The extent of the control of security systems varies from advisory to
in d ep en d en t operation. In one situation, a hum an uses o u tput from an expert
system to establish w hether or n o t there was (or is) an intrusion. The system may
no t work fast enough, so that an in tru d e r enters and exits the system being pro
tected before any action can be taken. In another situation, the system operates
on its own devices to determ ine w hether or no t som eone is a potential or actual
intruder. The system may lock o u t legitim ate users. In either situation, the longru n viability of the system being protected may be questioned.
In some situations, security expert systems may fall u n d er the set o f systems,
the failure of which could affect an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.
If the security system is ineffective at keeping out intruders, it could be exploited
or shut down, possibly leading to a going-concern issue.

Additional Reasons to
Audit an Expert System

T here are a n um ber of reasons to audit an expert system. These reasons include
econom ic conditions, specific m arket determ inants, and other factors. From an
econom ic perspective, audited inform ation is w orth m ore than unaudited infor
m ation. Thus, one can expect to see an audit as a m eans of creating value in
some circumstances.
Specific m arket determ inants include conflicts o f interest, the im portance
o f a system’s function, the complexity of a system, and insurance dem ands. A
conflict o f interest m ight occur when, for example, a system is to be sold for use
in another firm. The purchasing firm m ight no t believe all the claims of the sell
ing firm because it perceives the other firm ’s vested interest in selling the system.
In critically im portant situations, the life of an individual may depend on the
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p roper functioning o f an expert system. In such situations, greater confidence
would be given to an audited system. In o th er situations, an expert system may
be extremely com plicated. In these situations, an expert audit of the system may
be able to tu rn up problem s that normally would n o t have been found. Finally,
an audit can provide a type of insurance, since the audit provides a basis for
determ ining the accuracy of an expert system.

Techniques of
Verification
and Validation

The SSAE Attestation Standards states that an engagem ent can be perform ed only
if (a) the assertion is capable of evaluation against reasonable criteria that either
have been established by a recognized body or are stated in the presentation of
the assertion in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive m anner for a knowledge
able reader to be able to understand them , and (b) the assertion is capable of
reasonably consistent estimation or m easurem ent using such criteria. Again,
while Attestation Standards does n o t apply to internal auditors, it may provide
useful guidance.
In addition, Attestation Standards does n o t state the specific procedures that
the practitioner should use. Instead, it focuses on the objective, which is to accu
m ulate sufficient evidence to reduce attestation risk to a level that is, in the
ju d g m en t of the auditor, appropriately low for the high level o f assurance that
may be im parted by the auditor’s report. However, procedures should be chosen
in o rder to assess internal control risk and restrict detection risk, in com bination,
so as to limit attestation risk to an appropriately low level (see paragraph 39 of
Attestation Standards). Generally, these procedures will be derived from tests of
verification and validation. Verification has been defined in m uch of the com 
puter science literature as an exam ination o f the completeness, correctness,
redundancy, and consistency of software. This process as a whole has been called
“building the system right.” Validation has been defined as a determ ination of the
quality of the decisions m ade by a system, as com pared to specifications, hum an
experts, or alternative criteria. The process of validation has been called “build
ing the right system.” Accordingly, it is evident that verification and validation are
also concerned with the criteria and the consistency of estimation. An extensive
list of basic concerns and tests is developed in O ’Leary (1987).
This rep o rt briefly summarizes many of these techniques. However, the
reader seeking m ore detailed inform ation is referred to the references and to the
extensive references in the papers given therein.
This discussion draws on the substantial research on verification and vali
dation in the com puter science literature. However, n o t all of the issues relating
to verification and validation have been resolved. As a result, although some solu
tions are presented, the reader will have to look to future research for alternative
and additional solution procedures.

Verification1

The purpose o f verification is to determ ine w hether or no t the knowledge repre
sentation in an expert system is correct. Probably the m ost frequently used form
of knowledge representation is the rule “if a then b, with certainty factor y ” If one
assumes that the knowledge in an expert system is represented in the form of
rules, some of the verification tests can be specified.
Tests have been developed that can be used to determ ine when rules are
incorrect, incom plete, redundant, or inconsistent. The rules are incorrect if they
employ circular reasoning, as in the following example: “if a, then b; if b, then c;
if c, then a ." The rules are incom plete if there is a rule with no a or b. T here is
1 N a za re th ( 1 9 8 9 ), N y g u y en e t al. ( 1 9 8 7 ), O ’L eary a n d K a n d e lin ( 1 9 8 8 ), a n d O ’L eary (1 9 9 0 a a n d 1 9 9 0 b ).
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redundancy if there are m ultiple versions of the same rule in the same knowl
edge base. The rules are inconsistent if there are two rules such as the following:
“if a, then b” and “if a, then c.” In the last case, the occurrence of a leads to b and
c, yet it is unclear which should be used.
T here are also potential problem s with the representation of uncertainty
factors in expert systems. It has been found that developers of expert systems
have difficulty using some o f the schemes that have been developed to weigh the
im portance of the systems’ rules. As a result, the weights often do n o t m eet the
appropriate underlying assumptions o f probability theory.

Validation2

T he function of validation is concerned with the quality of the decisions of the
expert system. T here are a num ber o f approaches to assist the auditor in analyz
ing the validity o f an expert system.
O ne of the m ost frequently used approaches is for the expert to directly
inspect the knowledge. This approach could benefit from the developm ent of a
system that facilitates exam ination of the knowledge in the same way that audit
software assists auditors in the exam ination of a data base. Such a system could
allow the user to get a listing o f the rules, or to get a pictorial network representa
tion o f the rules to assist in understanding how different rules are connected to
each other.
A nother approach is to treat the expert system as a black box and to test
it against hum an experts. In such a test, the only concern is to determ ine the
similarity of the judgm ents generated by the system and by the hum an expert.
Typically, another hum an is used for purposes o f com parison to determ ine
which ju d g m en t is preferred. An alternative to this approach is to investigate the
expert system to understand why it m ade certain judgm ents. W hen this is done,
the explanation process plays a critical p art in the process, in that it allows the
reasoning used by the system to be analyzed.
Unfortunately, all of these m ethods require substantial hum an involvement.
As a result, there has been a m ovem ent to develop alternative m ethods that require
less direct hum an involvement. For example, O ’Leary and Kandelin (1988) pre
sent statistical m ethods based on the weights of the rules in the expert system.

Auditor Requirements

T he potential audit team associated with the audit o f an expert system m ust have
a broad base of knowledge. T he team m ust possess knowledge of the application
dom ain; otherwise it may be unable to determ ine when knowledge is incorrect.
In one situation discussed in the Wall StreetJournal, an expert on dams was
thought to have withheld knowledge. However, at the time of the construction
of the expert system, the developers had only a textbook knowledge of the
dom ain. Thus, they were unable to assess the contribution o f the expert.
T he team m ust include som eone knowledgeable about the tools of verifi
cation and validation in o rd er to test the system. T here is a broad literature of
approaches deriving from artificial intelligence, com puter science, and opera
tions research.
Finally, the team m ust include som eone with an understanding of auditing
approaches and the requirem ents o f auditing, and n o t ju st o f expert systems. In
addition, as discussed in the next chapter, an understanding of security needs is
also critical.

2 O ’L eary ( 1 9 8 7 ), O ’L eary a n d K a n d e lin ( 1 9 8 8 ), a n d O ’L eary (1 9 9 1 ).
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Chapter 4 .

Security o f Expert Systems
Although the analysis of the security o f expert systems is an audit issue, it is treated
separately, since security involves such a large set of issues. As noted below there is
little, if any, specific research in the area of expert system security. The discussion
presented here draws on the unique aspects of expert systems, as com pared to
other types of com puter programs.

Previous Research
on the Security of
Expert Systems

T here has been very lim ited research on the security of expert systems. In gen
eral, the closest discussion has been aim ed at general EDP systems. Since expert
systems essentially are com puter program s, they require the same security
m easures as other com puter program s. Many o f the security concerns relating
to traditional com puter program s have been addressed in other sources (for
example, H alper et al. [1985] and W eber [1988]) and, thus, are beyond the
scope of this report. However, expert systems differ in num erous ways from other
m ore traditional com puter program s. These differences require the investigation
o f additional security concerns. Accordingly, the approach here will be to elicit
some of these unique features and then discuss some of the controls that could
mitigate the risks.

Security Controls for
Expert Systems

The unique features of expert systems have a direct im pact on the security of
those systems. Some controls can be used with all types o f expert systems and
all types of expert system software shells.

Development
Environment

The controls devised for the developm ent m ethodology are those security
measures designed to prevent and detect the entry of inappropriate or wrong
knowledge into initial versions o f an expert system. A lthough prototyping pro
vides insights into the knowledge required for the problem-solving process, as
noted earlier there may be problem s m anaging the prototyping efforts. These
m anagem ent problem s may result in security problem s.
In addition, as expert systems move out of the lab and into production
other problem s may occur. As the num ber and size o f expert systems increase,
controls such as the m aintenance o f production schedules and quality assurance
becom e critical to project m anagem ent. Further, as an increasingly larger num 
ber of people becom e involved in the developm ent o f expert systems, the
possibility that security problem s will arise increases. The larger the num ber of
people involved, the m ore likely it will be that one o f them will attack the system.
In response to these concerns, some developers have recently suggested
that a m ore traditional software engineering approach be used to develop expert
systems. These m ethods are m ore structured and so may m ore effectively employ
controls to mitigate some of these problems.

Delivery Environment

The personal com puter environm ent, which impacts any PC application, has a
num ber of security threats associated with it. Since so many ES applications ru n
on PCs, controls for this environm ent are exam ined here. First, PC operating
systems such as DOS have few security devices built into them . For example,
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there is no general capability such as that provided by a system using passwords.
Thus, unless such controls are a p art of the ES shell, PC systems may be exploited
by unauthorized users. In some cases, ES shells allow developers to em bed pass
words. For example, Guru, which is designed for use in a DOS environm ent,
provides the designer with the ability to use passwords.
Second, m ost PCs are out in the open and easily accessed. A lthough locks
are available for PCs, they are seldom used. Further, in some cases the only way
to control access to a PC is to lock it in an office. T he accessibility o f PCs, com
bined with their easy-to-use interfaces, makes it easier to access knowledge.
Third, PCs are often brought out of the office to rem ote locations. The
security of the expert system (and other systems) on a PC can be enhanced if the
hard disk or diskettes are brought with the user whenever he or she leaves the PC.

Maintenance
Methodology

The security of the m aintenance o f an expert system is accom plished, in part,
using organizational controls. T he prim ary organizational response that has been
developed for expert systems is to designate an expert systems m anager (ESM).
The ESM is responsible for the overall operation and m aintenance o f a given
ES. Conceptually, the ESM is similar to a data-base administrator. Designating
an ESM allows for the assignm ent of responsibility, which is not the case with
team-based approaches.
An im portant m aintenance approach built into some ES shells and specific
systems is to use verification tests. Verification tests are controls on the quality of
the knowledge entered into particular ESs. For example, verification tests may
be designed to ensure that there is no circular reasoning (“if a, then b; if b, then
c; if c, then a”) . As o f this writing, the verification tests vary from shell to shell
and from ES to ES.
In some large ESs it may be cost-beneficial to develop a specific system
to assist in the updating and m aintenance process. For example, in the case of
EXPERTAX, a special m aintenance system has been developed to assist in the
process of updating the knowledge in that system.1

Software Limitations
(Preventing and
Detecting the Use of
Knowledge to
Camouflage
Other Activities)

Program m ing software m ight n o t m eet the needs of an application, requiring
special fixes and separate modules. If the software does n o t m eet the needs, one
form of control is a statem ent to that effect in the docum entation. A nother gen
eral form o f control is a requirem ent that such special fixes and the expected
behavior of the systems be docum ented.
O ne approach to the prevention and detection of the inappropriate use
o f special fixes is to use so-called intrusion-detection systems.2 These systems are
called intrusion-detection systems because they are designed to either detect or
prevent intrusions. They employ behavior patterns to establish expectations,
which are then com pared to actual behavior. Such systems consist of additional
com puter program s designed to m onitor the use of expert systems for unusual
activity, which may include unusual com puter program activity (such as that
which would occur with a Trojan horse program ) o r unusual user activity (such
as the use of a system at an unusual time of day or for an unusual purpose).

1 Shatz e t al. (1 9 8 7 ).
2 S e e , fo r e x a m p le , D e n n in g (1 9 8 7 ) a n d T e n o r (1 9 8 8 ).
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Downward delegation may occur when an expert system has been developed
using expertise that is gathered at a higher level in the organizational hierarchy
than the one in which it is to be used. In such situations, the expert may have a
higher priority or clearance level than the user for whom the system is designed.
Thus, the ES and the user have different levels o f data-base security.
O ne approach to this problem is to employ a data base for each ES,
ensuring that the ES data base does no t include any inform ation to which its
set of users should no t have access. Controls can be established to ensure that
users cannot derive data to which they do not have access.
However, doing so still does no t elim inate the basic problem s presented by
having different priority levels. T here appear to be few simple solutions to this
problem . A m ore com plicated approach is to develop a system that allows the ES
to access data but does n o t allow the user to see that data. This approach fully
accounts for the interm ediary nature of the user.

Source of the Data
(Preventing and
Detecting Use of the
Wrong Knowledge)

In some systems, the ES solicits data from the user. If the data are incorrect, the
wrong portion of the knowledge base will be searched. Thus, it is critical that an
ES provide controls on the data it solicits. These controls can include traditional
data-edit controls (for instance, num eric field tests). In addition, they can
include some specific application-based reasonableness tests. Such tests could
include analyses o f relationships between subm itted data items (for example,
those of the type “pay rate times hours worked = total pay”) or analytical tests of
reasonableness.

Symbolic and Numeric
Information (Preventing
and Detecting the
Changing of Knowledge)

T here are specific tests that can be used to prevent and detect changing either
the rules themselves or the weights on the rules.
O ne preventive approach is to provide the user with only a run-tim e ver
sion of the system (for example, a com piled version). W hen this is done, the user
can operate the system b u t n o t change it. However, in some cases, the user may
need or receive a version of the system that is no t a run-tim e version, or he or she
may have a copy o f the software with which the system was developed. Wh en this
is the case, providing a run-tim e version may no t be feasible, so alternative
approaches m ust be used. For example, if there are weights on the rules in an
expert system, a scheme could be devised to capture inform ation on the change
of the weights. Each weight could be m ultiplied by the num ber o f the rule, a
prim e num ber, or some oth er num ber. An unauthorized change o f one or m ore
weights would result in a change to the product, which could be used to detect
any changes. Further, some controls could be num eric in nature — for example,
the num ber of rules, the product o f the num ber of words in a rule and the rule
num ber, or some o th er num ber could provide a basis for detecting and control
ling changes to the system.
O ther traditional approaches such as base-case testing could be used to
detect the possibility o f a change. Unfortunately, unless the test data tested the
portion of the knowledge that was changed, this approach may n o t work.
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Explanation of
Knowledge (Preventing
Leakage of Knowledge)

20

The elim ination of unnecessary leakage of knowledge can be critical to the con
tinued success o f an expert system, and perhaps to the continued success o f the
com pany that uses it. Two different controls are found in some types of ES shells
that prevent the unw anted leakage of knowledge.
First, some shells offer the user the opportunity to provide an explanation
that does no t reveal the actual rules used by the expert system. These shells pro
vide control over what is shown to the user o f the ES, thereby controlling what is
known about the system by the user. This approach may also be used to make a
system easier to understand, since explanations (rather than system knowledge)
are presented to the user. Second, in those cases where the explanations do not
reveal the actual system knowledge, a run-tim e version can be used to control
access to the knowledge.

Additional Concerns Regarding
Both the Auditing and Security
__________ of Expert Systems________________
Chapter

5.

So far, this rep o rt has focused primarily on the unique aspects of expert systems
that affect auditing and security. However, expert systems are also com puter pro
grams and, thus, raise some of the same concerns that oth er com puter program s
do. This chapter exam ines some of these concerns that, although no t unique to
expert systems, have im portant implications for the audit and security o f expert
systems. In particular, this chapter is concerned with —
■
■
■
■

Integration of
Expert Systems

T he
T he
T he
T he

integration o f expert systems.
nature o f the auditor team.
attitude towards expert systems.
system developer.

Since there are a num ber of reasons to expect that expert systems are different
from other com puter systems, the integration of expert systems with traditional
com puter systems deserves additional consideration. Previous research has
exhibited a diversity of views on the im pact that integration has on both what is
audited and when it requires auditing. O ne author has suggested that “a system
that is em bedded in an accounts receivable application should be audited as
a separate entity and n o t merely as a com ponent o f the accounts receivable
system,” while an o th er gives the following example:
... [the] American Express expert system works under or is part of a much larger
overall credit authorization system, a conventionally programmed application. While
audit attention has almost certainly been given to that overall authorization system, it
would not necessarily be given to the Authoriser Assistant subsystem. The auditor
would give consideration to that subsystem only if it controlled a material amount of
the receivable balances.

Integration Of Systems
and Work Processes

The classic expert system is a stand-alone system that is designed to solve a single
problem or p art o f a problem . However, as they have evolved, expert systems
have begun to be integrated into o th er m ore traditional com puter systems. Thus,
an im portant concern in the audit of an expert system is the extent to which the
system is integrated with o th er systems or work processes. The integration o f sys
tems and processes is illustrated in the figure.
Stand-Alone
Problem

Integrated
Problem

Stand-Alone
System

A

B

Integrated
System

C

D

Integration o f Systems and Processes
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Impact on Audit

For systems o f type A, an audit o f the system can be decom posed from m uch o f
the rest of the firm for in d ep en d en t assessment. Systems in this category m ight
include a loan-approval system, in which many of each system’s activities and
users would be relatively in d ep en d en t of other activities and users.
However, for systems in categories B, C, and D, the expert system is part
of a system, a process, or both. It interacts with other com ponents of the system.
Accordingly, the auditor would be concerned with the expert system as a com po
n e n t that interacts with the rest of the system com ponents or work processes and
with the overall system.
Systems in category B are distinguished from those in category A by the
extent to which they com plete work on a given problem . If the system only pro
vides a solution for a part of the problem , as is the case in category B, there are a
num ber of other persons or processes with which it m ust interface. In addition,
there are a num ber o f o th er inputs and outputs required for the overall process.
Systems in categories C and D are m ore com plicated, since they are inte
grated with another system and possibly represent only a portion of the work
process. The integration with another system requires that input, output, or both
be exchanged between the systems in categories C and D and an o th er system.
The resulting interaction o f m ultiple systems can complicate the audit of the
expert system com ponent, since the systems would likely employ different tech
nologies. The im pact o f integration can be com plicated further by the nature
and audit requirem ents of the o th er systems. For example, if the other system is
an accounting data base from which the accounting financial statem ents are gen
erated, perform ing an audit becomes even m ore critical.
In any case, the prim ary concern should be the audit of the system. This
audit would include an audit of any expert system com ponent and an audit of the
system as a whole. By saying that a com ponent does not need an audit if it does not
include a material level of activity, one suggests that no system will ever have suffi
cient materiality to require an audit if the com ponents are m ade small enough.

Impact on Security

The degree to which an expert system is integrated with oth er systems is also
critical to its security. If an expert system is em bedded in another system with sub
stantial security controls, the expert system can also benefit from those controls.
However, if an expert system is em bedded in a system with a lesser degree of
security than would norm ally be accorded to the expert system, the expert
system faces exposure, which would n o t normally be a concern.
However, even if an expert system is em bedded in a system that is in a very
secure environm ent, the threats faced by the expert system may be different. For
example, a prim ary threat to an expert system could be posed by a lack of control
over access to its knowledge base. In such a situation, as it is in auditing, it is
im portant to consider both the individual expert system and the overall system
in which it is em bedded.

Nature of the
Auditing Team

Currently, there is a relatively small num ber of EDP auditors (auditors who
specialize in the audit and security analysis of com puter-based systems). This
specialty has developed over time in response to the need for auditors who
understand the com plicated audit and system environm ents of EDP operations.
In a similar sense, there is a need for expertise in the audit and security of
expert systems. The audit and security of expert systems require knowledge both
of the dom ain in which the system is built and o f expert systems technology.
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Need for
Domain Knowledge

Since an expert system captures dom ain knowledge, it is critical for an auditor to
be able to understand that knowledge. If the auditor does not possess any knowl
edge of the dom ain on which a system is based, it would be very difficult for him or
her to assess the quality or correctness of the knowledge used by the expert system.
T he im portance o f gaining an understanding of an expert system’s
dom ain becam e evident in the course of the developm ent o f such systems. W hen
an expert system is developed, the developers typically becom e “near-experts.”
Substantial case evidence indicates that even when the developers are n o t nearexperts at the beginning of the developm ent process, they are by the end o f the
process. For exam ple, to build a value-added-tax (VAT) expert system, knowledge
engineers found it necessary to travel with the VAT auditors for over a year. It
took that long for the developers to obtain a sufficient understanding o f the
dom ain to develop a system. (Today o f course, educating developers to such a
degree would probably be too costly.)

Need for a
Knowledge of
Expert Systems

While substantial com puter software has been developed to assist auditors in their
analysis of data-base systems, no such software has been developed to assist in the
analysis of knowledge bases. If an auditor does not know about the process of
knowledge representation or about expert systems in general, it would be very
difficult for him or h er to assess the quality or correctness of the knowledge repre
sentation in an expert system. In addition, it could be very difficult for an expert
to investigate aspects o f an expert system such as efficiency and effectiveness if the
auditor is unfam iliar with the technology. A lack of familiarity with the technology
can also limit the auditor’s understanding of potential security difficulties.

Source of
System Development

As is the case with oth er com puter systems, expert systems can be developed
internally or they can be purchased from a vendor. T he problem s associated with
user-developed expert systems include inadequate docum entation, a lack o f con
cern for security, control or audit m atters, poor program m ing, and insufficient
testing and evaluation of knowledge bases. (Similar problem s are associated with
systems developed in o th er environm ents, including research labs.) Typically,
problem s like those listed above indicate to the auditor that further testing o f the
system at h and is required. However, there are additional concerns associated
with user-developed systems, including determ ining the existence and extent of
use of such systems.

Finding the Systems

Systems developed by research labs or systems developm ent departm ents (as well
as systems purchased from outside vendors) often leave a clear trace o f their exis
tence and use. However, user-developed systems do no t always leave such a trace.
A lthough user-developed expert systems may be em bedded in decision processes
in a PC environm ent, their presence in a PC environm ent does not automatically
make their applications im m aterial. As a result, the auditor should take steps to
identify the existence o f these systems. Obviously, an expert system can be
audited (and its security needs can be assessed) only after it has been identified.
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Use of Expert Systems

Given the ease with which PC program s can be copied and im plem ented, audi
tors should no t be surprised to find that m ultiple copies of an expert system
may be dispersed th roughout the firm. W hen this is the case, the au d ito r’s con
sideration of materiality should no t be lim ited to the single copy of the software
that he or she has identified. The possible existence of any additional copies
should be investigated.

Attitudes Towards
Expert Systems

As noted earlier, expert systems em ulate hum an decision making. The very words
expert system draw an analogy between a hum an and a com puter program .
Accordingly, users of an expert system or those who interface with it may assume
that the system is m ore than ju st a com puter program .
For instance, in the case o f one expert system em bedded in a work process
of other com puter program s and users, it wasn’t clear to the users what the com
p u ter program could and could n o t be expected to do. People who interfaced
with the system assumed that since it was an expert system, it would perform a set
of activities as thoroughly and completely as a hum an would. However, the system
was specialized to accom plish a subset of a h u m an ’s activities. The hum ans who
interfaced with it were expected to do some of the activities that they assumed
the system would do.
The attitude towards an expert system can im pact its audit and security.
Thus, com pliance audit activity may be em phasized in the audit o f an expert sys
tem. The observation that a system can perform its set o f activities according to
expectations does no t guarantee that the overall set of expert system and hum an
activities will be done according to plan.
The security of an expert system could also be jeopardized when users
make assumptions about its security. For example, if a system has some intelli
gence, users m ight assume that this capability extends to the system’s security.
Such an assum ption could easily be unfounded.
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6.

Summary
This rep o rt has exam ined some of the issues in the audit and security of expert
systems. Since expert systems are com puter program s, they face some of the same
audit and security concerns as o th er com puter program s. However, expert sys
tems have a num ber o f unique characteristics, many o f which were summ arized
in this report. These unique characteristics require that special consideration be
given to the auditing and security of expert systems. In addition, they also form
the basis for the generation o f some audit and control procedures.
O ne o f the prim ary issues addressed in this rep o rt is identifying the sys
tems that should be audited. At least five different types o f systems have been
identified: systems that im pact the financial statements, systems that im pact the
going-concern status o f the firm , systems that provide inform ation that the audi
tor will rely on in an audit, systems for which efficiency and effectiveness are of
concern to the auditor, and systems that im pact the security o f o th er systems.
Tools that assist in the audit process include those developed by com puter
scientists and artificial intelligence researchers to verify and validate com puter
program s. Verification and validation are designed to ensure that a system is
“built rig h t” and that the “right system is built.” Verification and validation pro
vide the basis for a sequence o f tests o f the quality of the system.
Some features of expert systems that are also com m on to other com puter
systems can assist in determ ining critical audit and security activities. In particu
lar, the degree o f an expert system’s integration with traditional systems, the
nature o f the audit team, the source of the expert system developm ent effort,
and the users’ attitudes towards an expert system also im pact im portant audit
and security steps.
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